Large blocks of stock play an important role in many studies of corporate governance and finance. Despite this important role, there is no standardized data set for these blocks, and the best available data source, Compact Disclosure, has many mistakes and biases. In this paper, we document these mistakes and show how to fix them. The mistakes and biases tend to increase with the level of reported blockholdings: in firms where Compact Disclosure reports that aggregate blockholdings are greater than 50 percent, these aggregate holdings are incorrect more than half the time and average holdings for these incorrect firms are overstated by almost 30 percentage points. For researchers using uncorrected blockholder data as a dependent variable, these errors will increase the standard error of coefficient estimates but do not appear to cause bias. However, we find that if blockholders are used as an independent variable, economically significant errors-in-variables biases can occur. We demonstrate these biases using a representative analysis of the relationship between firm value and outside blockholders. An online appendix to our paper provides a "clean" data set for our sample firms and time period. For researchers who need to work outside of this sample, we also test the efficacy of alternative (cheaper) fixes to this data problem, and find that truncating or winsorizing the sample can reduce about half of the bias in our representative application.
I. Introduction
Large-block shareholders play an important role in corporate governance. For this reason, the presence of such "blockholders" and the size of their holdings is a common explanatory variable in financial research. In just the last few years, a representative sample of such studies includes analyses of the role of blockholders in executive turnover, executive compensation, firm diversification, discretionary expenses, market liquidity, and corporate performance. 1 Furthermore, blockholder data is a crucial input in the analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and firm value, where seminal works by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988) gave rise to a vast and growing literature.
Despite the common use of large shareholder data, there is no clean off-the-shelf database to facilitate research. Many of the papers cited above required their authors to gather their own data. This time-consuming task is necessary because of several weaknesses in the available databases. Of course, decentralized data gathering causes duplication of effort and lack of standardization across projects. Also, because of the large time commitment necessary to clean the data for each firm, most researchers have gathered data for a relatively small number of firms. This paper aims to fill this data gap by documenting the problems with the currently available data, proposing a consistent set of solutions to these problems, and making a "clean" database freely available to all researchers.
2 Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of clean (vs. raw) data with a representative study on the relationship between outside blockholders and firm value and discuss some alternatives to this exhaustive cleaning for other samples.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) lays out the ownership disclosure requirements for public corporations in Regulation 14A and Schedule 14A. Virtually everything we know about blockholders in the United States comes from these disclosure requirements, which are described in detail in Appendix A of this paper. The two main types of data produced by the SEA are for holdings (once per year, reported in the annual proxy statement), and for transactions by corporate insiders and beneficial owners (updated through Forms 3, 4 and 5) . While the trading data would appear to provide the most current and comprehensive information, past research has demonstrated that this data is difficult to work with and cannot be relied upon to infer the holdings of individual blockholders (Anderson and Lee (1997a and 1997b) , Jeng et al. (2003) ). Thus, we focus in this paper on the annual proxy data, which is more reliable and more commonly used by researchers.
Proxy data is available from many sources, including direct electronic access using the SEC's "Edgar" tool for all corporate filings since the mid-1990s. For large-scale data downloads, however, it is necessary to use a commercial product. The most widely used product is the Compact Disclosure (CD) database of Standard & Poor's. Anderson and Lee (1997a and 1997b) focus their analysis on the holdings of corporate officers and directors, and show that CD accurately reproduces the information in proxy statements for all firms except those with multiple classes of stock. While CD also reproduces data on blockholders from the tables in the proxy statement, there are additional problems with these data. We discuss these problems and their solutions in Section II, and summarize the changes for a large sample of firms from 1996 to 2001. For researchers using blockholder data in regression analysis, the raw data present an errors-in-variables problem. If blockholder data is used as a dependent variable, then these errors only cause biases if they are correlated with the regressors. In section II we demonstrate that the errors are independent of a set of logical regressors, so bias is unlikely for many applications.
If, however, blockholders are used as an independent variable, then there are several possible biases. In Section III, we perform a representative study using both raw CD data and a "clean" data set where the CD data problems have been fixed. In our sample, we find that the raw data is much noisier: in annua l regressions of Tobin's Q on outside blockholder ownership and other control variables, the clean data set is far more likely to yield statistically significant point estimates for the ownership variables. Furthermore, bootstrap estimations demonstrate that improved precision is the typical outcome for this regression.
The good news is that the bias appears restricted to the blockholder coefficients only, with no bias induced for the coefficients in other regressions.
Since our cleaned data is only available for a subset of firms and years, researchers will also be interested in the efficacy of alternative fixes for these data errors. In Section IV we discuss several alternatives based on truncating, winsorizing, or partial cleaning. While several of these fixes can alleviate the errors-in-variables bias, an economically significant bias still remains in all cases, with the best fix eliminating approximately one-half of the bias.
Section V summarizes and concludes. Two appendices supplement the text. Appendix A provides details on the 1934 SEA and the disclosure requirements it created, and Appendix B provides details on the construction of our sample.
II. Data

A. Sample Firms
Our initial sample of firms consists of firms that are covered by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) for both their publication Corporate Takeover
Defenses (Rosenbaum 1995 (Rosenbaum , 1998 (Rosenbaum , 2000 and their director's database which provides details on the board of directors for about 1,500 of the largest U.S. companies. The IRRC's universe is drawn from the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 as well as the annual lists of the largest corporations in the publications of Fortune, Forbes, and Businessweek. We use the IRRC sample as a starting point because a wide range of governance data is available for this group of companies and our goal is to make this set of data as comprehensive as possible for this group. 3 A special subset of the IRRC companies -less than 10 percent in all years -have multiple classes of common stock. For these companies, Anderson and Lee (1997a) showed there are many problems with the CD data, and these problems are very difficult to fix. In this paper, we eliminate all multiple-class companies from the database and start with the approximately 1300 firms per year (7,873 firm-years) for the single-classed companies in the IRRC sample from 1996 to 2001. 4 The initial ownership data comes from the CD compact-disk product. Based on the results of Anderson and Lee (1997a, 1997b) we build our sample from the information on large shareholders that CD derives directly from the proxies and ignore the insider-trading data that is also available on the disks. Appendix B provides details on the construction of the initial database. 3 For example, the IRRC data has been used as a starting point by Gompers et al. (2003) , Cremers and Nair (2004), and Gillan et al. (2003) . 4 The dual-class companies are analyzed in a companion paper, Gompers et al. (2004) , where we attempt to build a comprehensive sample of all dual-class companies with any share-class trading on any major exchange in the United States.
We next check the initial database by comparing the CD data to the original proxy statements, which we obtain from Livedgar, 5 making changes to the ownership percentages of large shareholders where appropriate. All firms in the sample were checked -even those with no reported blockholders in CD. We employ the following general rules when deciding on share ownership. The SEC defines beneficial ownership as either voting or investment power, and sometimes companies report both measures in their proxies. We use voting power as opposed to investment power for our database when a distinction is made between the two.
Also, even if individuals discla im beneficial ownership of some portion of their holdings in the proxy, we treat these holdings as if the individual had the voting power. Under the terms of SEC Rule 13d-3, shares of common stock that may be acquired within 60 days are deemed outstanding for the purposes of computing the percentage of common stock owned by a shareholder. We follow this SEC rule and include these options. In the rare cases of a company having a temporary ownership structure resulting from a recent merger or acquisition, we remove these companies from our sample for that year. For 229 (2.9%) sample firms, proxy information could not be obtained, and these firm-years were removed from our sample. Our final sample consists thus of 7,649 firm-years and covers 1,913 unique firms. Table 1 shows summary statistics of our sample firms. The table is based on crosssectional averages of time-series means.
Many researchers are interested in knowing whether a specific blockholder is an "insider" or an "outsider" to the firm. The role of a large shareholder in corporate governance is often treated differently depending on the classification of the shareholder.
Since our work required the examination of all blockholders, the marginal cost of coding these classifications was relatively lo w, so we did so. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
The possible classifications are (1) officer, (2) Examples of these two cases are documented below in Subsection 1. Second, CD sometimes misrepresents preferred shares as common equity ownership. This problem is illustrated below in Subsection 2. Subsection 3 discusses miscellaneous other problems.
Overlaps
Full overlaps can arise in two types of situations. In the first scenario, two or more blockholders are listed in the ownership table with the same shareholdings and the joint ownership of these shares is disclosed only by the footnotes. In the second scenario, the proxy separates the beneficial ownership of directors and officers from that of large shareholders and CD reproduces entries from both tables without cross-checking identities.
Figures 1 and 2 display an example of the latter case. Figure 1 shows the CD data for Coca Cola Co. from the October 1999 disk, and Figure 2 shows an excerpt of the proxy statement from March 4th, 1999 on which the data is based. While CD's blockholder data is accurate in a literal sense with respect to the two tables in the proxy, the vital information of the proxy footnote is ignored. Figure 1 lists Berkshire Hathaway and Warren Buffett individually as 8.10% owners of the common stock. Referring to the footnote 4 of Figure 1 (the ownership Figure 3 , where the Spectrum data is listed after the delimiter '***^', it is stated that there are five 5%
owners who hold an aggregate of 62.06% of common stock.
Both of the above examples are relatively easy to spot and correct. However, many companies have more complex overlaps which translate into more detailed footnotes and longer amounts of time that a researcher must spend examining them. These types of overlaps include those among companies, subsidiaries, individuals, and trusts. When the information in the footnotes is insufficient to determine the ultimate control of these shares, we follow the rule of assigning these shares to the partial owner who is closest to control of the company: officers first, then directors, and then outsiders.
2) Preferred Stock
There are two ways in which preferred shares can erroneously enter into the beneficial ownership figures. A company may report ownership of common stock and preferred stock separately but side-by-side in the same proxy table. In this case, CD will pick up all of the percentages in the table without distinguishing between the two categories of stock, giving us two different ownership figures for shareholders holding both preferred and common stock. Figure 5 shows one example from the original CD database, and Figure 6 shows the corresponding proxy statement. Some companies structure their proxy statements by listing common and preferred ownership side-by-side, but also giving an aggregated ownership figure. In these cases, CD tends to erroneously pick up just the aggregate ownership figure, without doing any adjustment for the relative voting power between the common and preferred. In our corrected data, we include only the common-stock component of voting.
3) Other problems
The vast majority of other proble ms are blocks that are simply missed by CD. Most often, this stems from the firm not following the standard procedure of having a table with the names of certain beneficial owners or principal shareholders, but rather embedding this information in the text. CD does not capture information from the text.
In addition, CD sometimes picks up information from both a preliminary proxy and a final proxy. Each shareholder would then be recorded twice, with two different proxy source dates and the same percentage of holdings. Also, in rare cases, CD makes typos entering the percentage of shares held (i.e. 9.08% instead of 9.80%). Finally, sometimes the proxy allows us to break out blockholdings more specifically. Most often, it would be a bank that holds a certain amount of shares in its capacity as the ESOP trustee and another amount for its retail customers. Often, this number is lumped together in the proxy, and if the footnote allows us to separate them, we do.
C. The Corrected Data
The first four rows of Table 3 show the frequency of the corrections we made by groups of overall shares held by blockholders. Using a non-parametric Wilcoxon difference test, we find that the corrected and raw percentages of rows three and four are statistically different for all 6 groups of blockholders at the one percent level. The remainder of Table 3 shows the frequency of each of the problems. It is evident from Table 3 Errors tend to increase with aggregate blockholdings in CD for the simple reason that the errors themselves tend to increase the aggregates: e.g., an overlap for a jointly held block of 25 percent will lead to a CD aggregate of 50 percent. While the errors are rare for low levels of aggregate holdings, they are common at higher levels and are economically significant. In the most extreme category (>50% in CD), the average holdings in the raw data for firms with errors fall from over 100 percent (clearly impossible) to under 50 percent.
Emp irical economists are accustomed to working with noisy data. The impact of measurement error often depends upon the correlation of the noise with other explanatory variables. Table 4 shows the correlations among the blockholder variables, including the error term (clean blockholder hold ings minus raw blockholder holdings) and several other firm-level characteristics. The good news for researchers is that the error term appears to be uncorrelated with all of these variables. Thus, regressions with blockholder data as the dependent variable are likely to provide unbiased coefficient estimates -at least for these variables. Of course, the additional noise in the dependent variable will tend to increase standard errors, but with enough data this problem can be overcome. Table 5 summarizes the output for a multivariate Tobit regression of outside blockholder holdings on the logarithms of firm age and the book value of assets. These two regressors are chosen because they are the only two characteristics in Table 4 that are significantly correlated with blockholding. The Tobit regression is left-censored at 0. The table shows no clear bias in the coefficients for either regressor, but the standard errors are always higher for the raw regressions. Nevertheless, there is sufficient data so that differences for inference are minor.
III. A Representative Analysis: Outside Blockholders and Firm Value
If blockholder data is used as an independent variable, then there are several potential sources of bias. This measurement error ("errors-in-variables") problem is well-studied by econometricians, with the quantitative importance of the problem depending upon the severity of the measurement error and the correlation of this error with other variables of interest. 7 In this section, we assess the impact of this problem using a representative analysis of the relationship between firm value and outside blockholdings. Specifically, for each year t, we estimate
where Q is a measure of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, OWN and OWN 2 are the fraction and fraction squared held by outside blockholders, X is a vector of control variables, and e is an
iid error term, all measured for firm i at time t. We follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and measure Q as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets: the market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes. The X vector includes a Delaware incorporation dummy (Daines, 2001) , an S&P 500 inclusion dummy (Mørck and Yang, 2001) , the log of sales for the previous fiscal year, and the log of firm age (months since first public listing).
We make no claims for any causal relationship here. Any regression of firm value on ownership will be fraught with endogeneity concerns, a point first made by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and followed up by many other authors. 8 Rather, we intend only to test whether all our cleaning effort yields any meaningful differences in coefficient estimates or statistical significance. To do so, we start with this simple and obvious regression. Table 6 summarizes the results of regression (1) estimated separately for each year from 1996 to 2001, with each regression estimated using both raw and cleaned data. The results suggest that the raw data is much noisier, as the coefficients on the OWN variables are almost always closer to zero and lower in statistically significance than are the corresponding coefficients using cleaned data. Overall, the cleaned data demonstrate a far more robust relationship between outside block ownership and firm value. While the economic interpretation of this result is clouded by endogeneity concerns, the research importance of using the cleaned data is clear.
The results of Table 6 demonstrate that our proposed corrections matter for one "draw" of history. To get a better understanding for the robustness of these results, we use a bootstrap method to simulate 25,000 draws. Instead of drawing from a specified distribution, the bootstrap draws with replacement from the sample. For a linear regression model like (1), the sample provides the empirical distribution for the dependent variable, the independent variables and the error term as well as estimates for constant, slope, and error variance.
Our example focuses on one year (1998) of data only, because it is reasonable to assume that the assumptions for an iid nonparametric bootstrap with paired sampling are fulfilled for cross-sectional data. Time-series and panel data would require more sophisticated bootstrap techniques without a corresponding advantage for our analysis.
Specifically, we begin with the 1998 observed sample of ν = 1, ...,1,216 independent observations for our dependent variable ( ψ = ψ1,...,ψ1216) (industry-adjusted Q ), and the independent variables ( ξ = ξ1, ..., ξ1216.) of the regression in Table 6 . A paired bootstrap sample is obtained by independently drawing Ν = 25,000 pairs (ξι, ψ ι) from the observed sample with replacement. While the bootstrap sample has the same number of observations, some observations appear several times and others never. We then estimate (1) with each of the 25,000 bootstrapped samples.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the results for the coefficients on outside blockholders and outside blockholders squared, respectively. It is clear from the figures that the results of Table 6 are no fluke, as bootstrap distributions appear quite different in the two cases (raw and cleaned). These figures illustrate the emp irical distribution of the coefficients across all 25,000 draws. If we compare the coefficients within the same draw, we find that the absolute coefficient on blockholders for the cleaned data is greater than its corresponding coefficient for the raw data in 97.6% of the 25,000 draws. Similarly, the coefficient on blockholders squared for the cleaned data is greater than its corresponding coefficient for the raw data in 94.4% of the 25,000 draws. For the coefficient on blockholdings, 86.5% of the cleanedsample estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, while only 43.6%
of the raw-sample estimates meet those conditions. For the coefficient on blockholdings squared, 52.4% of the cleaned-sample estimates are positive and statistically significant, while only 15.9% of the truncated-sample estimates meet those conditions. Overall, we conclude that measurement error is a significant problem for inference on these two coefficients.
Measurement error for one regressor (blockholders) may also affect inference for the other regressors. There are two concerns here. First, if the measurement error (for blockholders) is correlated with other regressors, then the coefficients on these regressors would themselves be subject to measurement-error bias. Second, as measurement error (for blockholders) goes to infinity, then the blockholder regressor is effectively omitted from the estimation and the other regressors are subject to omitted-variable bias, with the direction of this bias dependent upon the full set of covariances.
The evidence of Tables 3 and 4 in Section II suggests that the first problem is not quantitiatively important: since the blockholder error appears uncorrelated with the other regressors, there is no direct bias induced by this error. To quantify the importance of the second problem, Table 7 summarizes the bootstrap estimates for the other coefficient estimates in regression (1), using the same draws as summarized in Figures 7 and 8 . The table summarizes analogues to a "95%-confidence interval" around the median draw. When comparing the corresponding intervals from the raw and cleaned data, there is no apparent pattern, and certainly no significant pattern. Thus, we conclude that the measurement error does not contaminate other coefficient s in (1).
IV. Alternatives to Cleaning the Whole Sample?
It may not always be practical to use a cleaned sample of blockholdings. For an analysis outside the sample or time period discussed in this paper, researchers may still need to use raw data. Thus, it may be helpful to understand the efficacy of alternative (cheaper) fixes for the raw CD data. Since we found economically significant bias only when blockholders were used as a independent variable, we focus attention on that case in this section, and we repeat OLS regression (1) for 1998 using several alternatives: samples truncated at 50% or 100% blockholder ownership ; samples winsorized at 50% or 100% blockholder ownership; and samples cleaned only for firms with blockholder ownership greater than 50% or 100%. We also estimate a median regression of (1) . The use of 50% and 100% is arbitrary but seems reasonable for this application, and also is close to the standard cutoffs of 95 th percentile (which would be 58% ownership here) and 99 th percentile (which would be 108% ownership here), respectively. Table 8 reports the results. It does not appear that any of these low-cost fixes are effective. While all truncations or winsorizations appear to reduce the errors-in-variables bias, none of these simple fixes would yield inferences similar to those of the cleaned regression in Table 4 . The best results from this group are obtained by truncating at 100%
blockholdings, or by manually cleaning all blocks over 50% ownership or over 100%
ownership. All three of these best alternative fixes yield about the same changes in the key coefficients. Since truncation at 100% is certainly the least costly fix to implement, it seems to be the alternative of choice.
To further investigate the use of truncation at 100%, we also obtain 25,000 bootstrap estimates using the same procedures as in Section III. These bootstrap estimates are consistent with the findings of Table 8 . For the coefficient on blockholdings, 86.5% of the cleaned-sample estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, while only 55.6% of the truncated-sample estimates meet those conditions. For the coefficient on blockholdings squared, 52.4% of the cleaned-sample estimates are positive and statistically significant, while only 35.3% of the truncated-sample estimates meet those conditions.
V. Conclusion
Researchers rely on ownership data for many studies. The lack of a standardized source of data on large blockholders is an impediment to this work. In this paper, we document the weaknesses with the commonly used data, show how to fix them, and demonstrate that these fixes are both quantitatively large and also important for some applications.
The measurement error in blockholder data creates several possibilities for bias. Our analysis suggests that emp irical work with blockholder data as the dependent variable will produce unbiased results, as the measurement error is not correlated with the other firm-level characteristics that we tested. While the measurement error does increase standard errors, the increase is not severe.
Researchers who use blockholder data as an independent variable face a larger challenge. In a representative analysis of firm value and blockholdings, we find that using the uncorrected raw data leads to significant biases for the blockholder coefficients, and simple fixes such as truncating or winsorizing the sample provide only partial alleviation of these biases. The coefficients on other regressors do not appear to have biases. Thus, if the blockholder effects are the key independent variable, we believe it is necessary to work with a cleaned sample. If blockholder data is only being used as a control variable, then a cleaned sample is much less crucial.
Appendix A -Legal Rules
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rules 13d-1 to 13d-7 ( §240.13d) and rules 16a-1 to 16e-1 ( §240.16a-e), contain the legal definitions and filing requirements for what the corporate finance literature has termed "blockholders". While 13D defines beneficial ownership and describes the disclosure requirements of these shareholders, rules 16a-e detail the reporting requirements on transactions made by corporate insiders. The company in turn is required to disclose blockholder information to shareho lders via proxies under Regulation and Schedule 14a ( §240.14a), commonly called the "proxy" statement. Item 403 refers to Rule 13d-3 for the determination of beneficial ownership, and it details specific guidelines for disclosing the nature of the beneficial ownership. Information in sub-columns or footnotes must be included and reflect the number of shares of which a beneficial owner has sole or shared voting power as well as sole or shared investment power.
Similarly, the number of shares a beneficial owner has the right to acquire must be listed in a footnote, as well as any arrangements or pledges that could lead to a change of control of shares. Item 403 also specifies that a company must use appropriate disclosure to avoid confusion where more than one beneficial owner is listed for the same secur ities. When a beneficial owner owns shares pursuant to a voting trust or agreement, the company must state in a table or footnote the title of the securities, the amount held or to be held according to the trust or agreement, and the duration of the agreement. The company must also disclose the names and addresses of the voting trustees and outline briefly their voting rights and powers under the trust or agreement.
Appendix B -Details on the Sample Construction
In a first step, we matched the IRRC database with data from CD pertaining to large shareholders and directors and officers. CD stores company data on compact disks that are updated monthly. The month of the update depends on the company's fiscal year end, and, for data pertaining to the board of directors, on the company's proxy meeting date. Since CD often does not keep information until the next update, but rather removes stale data from the monthly disks, searching the right month after the proxy meeting is important. In the earlier sample years, a lag of 6 months from proxy meeting month to issuance of data disk yielded the most reliable results. Starting in 2000, CD data are usually updated in the month following the annual meeting.
We then sort, for each sample year, all IRRC firms by proxy meeting month. We download through a ticker merge the large shareholder data (field SH) and information on directors (field DO) and officers (field NA) from the appropriate monthly CD disk in the tagged format. Figure 1 shows an example of our raw database. The search string automatically yields a summary of the insider-trading data compiled by Spectrum (Form 3, 4, and 5), which we discard. 10 Note from Figure 1 that CD mentions the source and source date of the director and ownership information in parentheses. Using this information, we ensure that all ownership information is taken from proxy statements. We are able to match 94% of all firm-years with our search strategy through CD. The remaining firms were looked up directly from the proxies. Thus, 6% of the final CD sample is comprised of entries that we constructed ourselves from the proxies.
In a next step, we use a SAS program to convert the data of Figure 1 into an easy-touse SAS database. The SAS program loops through the information on officers and directors, provided by CD in the fields NA-and DO-, and identifies a large shareholder entry as either director or officer if the character string for a blockholder (in the SH-section of the CD data) matched a character string in the officer or director sections (NA-, DO-) of the data. CD is extremely accurate and consistent in the spelling of names across fields, as it takes the names exactly as they appear in the proxy statements.
11
10 Anderson and Lee (1997a) caution that the proxy's definition of an insider (an officer or director) is not the same as the definition used for the insider-trading filings (which also includes any shareholder of 10% or more) compiled by Spectrum. When they compare Spectrum data to the benchmark proxy data on management ownership, they find that 40.7% of their sample has a reporting discrepancy of over 5% (p. 316). They also refute the claim that the Spectrum data are more current than the most recent proxy data, showing that the filing dates listed in the Spectrum section of the CD data are sometimes "stale" by two or more years (Anderson and Lee (1997b), p. 3-4) . An additional concern for us is a date mismatch, as the Spectrum data is updated at various points during the year, while the director's database stems from the annual proxy statements. Indeed, the Spectrum data of Figure 1 is incorrect. 11 However, the automated process will not correctly match variations such as "The Smith family trust" with a director named Peter H. Smith. These corrections are done manually in the data cleaning process. The table describes summary statistics of key sample firm characteristics. The sample period is 1996 -2001. The total sample consists of large publicly listed U.S. firms, a total of 7,649 firm-years and 1,913 unique firms. The table contains cross-sectional means and medians of firm time-series averages. Firm age is measured as months since first listing. Market value, total assets, sales, and common equity are taken from Compustat. The book-to-market ratio is book value of common equity to market value of common equity. Book value of common equity is the sum of book common equity (Compustat item 60) and deferred taxes (item 74).
The capex-to-sales ratio is capital expenditures (item 128) divided by net sales. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (item 6), where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of the book value of common stock (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74).
All book values for fiscal year t (from Compustat) are combined with the market value of common equity at the calendar end of year t. Return on assets (equity) is calculated as income before extraordinary items (item 18) divided by item 6 (item 60). The Governance Index is a measure of shareholder rights developed by Gompers, Ishhii, and Metrick (2003) and available through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). All director variables are from the director database of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The first three rows of this table contain summary statistics for the cleaned sample by calendar year. The sample construction is explained in Appendix B. The bottom part of the table shows the frequency of each category of large shareholders. Officers are officers, and possibly also directors of the firm. Directors are all non-officer directors. Affiliated entities are individuals, trusts or companies whose voting outcome is at least partially influenced or outright determined by an officer or director of the company. ESOPs are Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Outside Blockholders are all individuals or entities that are none of the above. 
Fraction of Common Stock Held by Large Shareholders
This table reports the occurrence of the four problems associated with using the raw large shareholder database available through Compact Disclosure. We classify the firms into six different categories based on the sum of the blockholdings. The first row shows the number of firms by blockholding category. The second row shows the fraction of entries by category that needed to be corrected. The third and fourth row contain the average sum of blockholdings by category before and after cleaning, where the categorization is done by the sum of blockholdings as they appear in the raw data. The second part of the table describes the four situations that required cleaning. The four problems are full overlap, partial overlap, the treatment of preferred shares, and other problems. The second and third row of each reported problem show how the percentage holdings change given we observe the problem. The table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample year 1998. Significance at the 1% level is denoted by **, and significance at the 5% level is denoted by *. The variables are defined as follows. Sum of blockholdings is the sum of 5% blocks held by all entities from the cleaned database. Sum of outside (inside) bh is the sum of all blocks held by entities that were classified as outsiders (insiders or affiliates). Bh Error is the sum of 5% blocks held by all entities from our cleaned database minus the sum of 5% blocks held by all entities from the raw database. Book value of assets is taken from Compustat's industrial annual database, item 6. Firm age is the number of months since the first listing on a stock exchange. Capex / sales is item 128 divided by item 12. Capital intensity and R&D intensity are defined as in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) . Capital intensity is PPE (item 30) over sales. R&D intensity is R&D (item 46) over sales. Leverage is defined as long term and short term debt (item 9 and 34) over assets. Cashflow is defined as income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus depreciation and amortization (item 14) This table presents the coefficients, before and after our cleaning procedure, from annual cross-sectional Tobit regressions of the fraction of the firm held by outside blocks on the logarithm of book value of assets and firm age. The natural logarithm of firm age in months is measured as months since first listing, and is obtained from CRSP. Book value of assets is obtained from Compustat (item 6). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the one-percent and five-percent levels is indicated by ** and * respectively. This table presents the coefficients of the sum of outside blockholdings and squared outside blockholdings, before and after our cleaning procedure, from annual cross-sectional regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q on the blockholdings and control variables. The control variables include a Delaware dummy, S&P 500 affiliation, the natural logarithm of firm age in months (measured as months since first listing, obtained from CRSP), and the natural logarithm of firm sales (obtained from Compustat). For simplicity, the coefficients on the control variables are omitted from the table. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the one-percent and five-percent levels is indicated by ** and * , respectively. Entries in bold denote a difference in the level of statistical significance between the coefficients in the regressions for the raw and the cleaned data. Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets: the market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock less the book value of common stock and deferred taxes. The market value of equity is measured at the end of the current calendar year, and the accounting variables are measured in the current fiscal year. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting the industry median, where medians are calculated by matching the four-digit SIC codes from December of each y ear to the 48 industries designated by Fama and French [1997] . This table presents the coefficients of the sum of the fraction of the firm held as outside blocks and squared outside blockholdings, before and after our cleaning procedure, and from various alternative regression setups involving the 1998 cross-sectional regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin's Q on the blockholdings and all of the control variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and significance at the one-percent and five-percent levels is indicated by ** and *, respectively. 
Set forth in the table below is information as of December 31, 1998 with respect to persons known to the Company to be the beneficial owners of more than five percent of the Company's issued and outstanding stock: 
NUMBER OF SHARES PERCENT NAME AND ADDRESS BENEFICIALLY OWNED OF CLASS ------------------------------------------
SERIES B COMMON STOCK PREFERRED STOCK ------------------------------------NAME AND ADDRESS NUMBER OF PERCENT NUMBER OF PERCENT OF OWNER SHARES OF CLASS SHARES OF CLASS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
